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Abstract 
It is well known that Niels Bohr insisted on the necessity of classical concepts in the 
account of quantum phenomena. But there is little consensus concerning his reasons, 
and what he exactly meant by this. In this paper, I re-examine Bohr’s interpretation of 
quantum mechanics, and argue that the necessity of the classical can be seen as part of 
his response to the measurement problem. More generally, I attempt to clarify Bohr’s 
view on the classical/quantum divide, arguing that the relation between the two theories 
is that of mutual dependence. An important element in this clarification consists in 
distinguishing Bohr’s idea of the wave function as symbolic from both a purely 
epistemic and an ontological interpretation. Together with new evidence concerning 
Bohr’s conception of the wave function collapse, this sets his interpretation apart from 
both standard versions of the Copenhagen interpretation, and from some of the 
reconstructions of his view found in the literature. I conclude with a few remarks on 
how Bohr’s ideas make much sense also when modern developments in quantum 
gravity and early universe cosmology are taken into account. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Foundational discussions of quantum mechanics routinely include reference to the 
Copenhagen interpretation. Though this interpretation is supposed to originate with 
Niels Bohr, there is often some confusion concerning both what the Copenhagen 
interpretation precisely amounts to, and which parts of this interpretation are associated 
with whom of the founding figures of quantum mechanics. But there are signs that the 
mist is beginning to clear up. For instance, Howard (2004) convincingly argues that 
critics of the Copenhagen interpretation often conflate Heisenberg’s views with Bohr’s, 
and Faye (2008) gives a very helpful overview of the main tenets in Bohr’s thinking.  
Even among friends of Bohr, however, there are still disagreements about how 
best to understand him. It is well known that Niels Bohr insisted on the necessity of the 
concepts of classical physics in the description of quantum phenomena. But there is 
little consensus concerning the justification, and the philosophical implications of this 
idea. Relatedly, or so I will argue, there is little consensus concerning Bohr’s view on 
the wave function, the quantum measurement problem, and, more generally, the relation 
between classical and quantum physics. This paper is part of a series which aim to 
clarify and defend Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. At the same time, the 
proposed clarification should be helpful for situating Bohr in relation to contemporary 
philosophical debates of quantum mechanics in which the wave function, the 
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measurement problem and the classical/quantum relationship are central topics. 
The lack of consensus among Bohr commentators regarding the role and status 
of the classical concepts is perhaps not surprising, given Bohr’s own enigmatic accounts 
of his view. In one of its most quoted forms, Bohr expressed the necessity of classical 
concepts thus (1949, p. 39): 
 
[I]t is decisive to recognize that, however far the phenomena transcend 
the scope of classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence 
must be expressed in classical terms. The argument is simply that by the 
word “experiment” we refer to a situation where we can tell others what 
we have done and what we have learned and that, therefore, the account 
of the experimental arrangement and of the results of the observations 
must be expressed in unambiguous language with suitable application of 
the terminology of classical physics. [Emphasis in original]  
 
Generations of physicists and philosophers have questioned the reasoning behind, and 
the simplicity of, this type of argument. For instance, after having read Bohr’s response 
to the famous Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen paper, Schrödinger wrote in a letter to 
Bohr: 
 
There must be quite definite and clear grounds, why you repeatedly 
declare that one must interpret observations classically, which lie 
absolutely in their essence…. It must belong to your deepest conviction 
and I cannot understand on what you base it.  
 [Schrödinger to Bohr (1935), quoted from Howard (1994, p. 201)] 
 
In what follows I will attempt to answer Schrödinger’s question on behalf of Bohr by 
re-examining Bohr’s writings.
2
 This will include, in section 2, briefly recalling Bohr’s 
notion of complementarity, clarifying his view on the wave function, and providing new 
evidence regarding his conception of the wave function collapse. With these elements in 
place, section 3 will frame the necessity of the classical in terms of Bohr’s response to 
the measurement problem, and his demand for a reference frame. Section 4 will treat the 
more general question of the relation between the classical and the quantum in light of 
Bohr’s view on the stability of matter (an issue which has so far been little discussed in 
the literature). Finally, in section 5, I sum up and briefly indicate how Bohr’s 
interpretation of quantum mechanics still makes much sense also in the current 
landscape of cosmology and fundamental physics. 
 
 
2. Elements of Bohr’s view 
 
2.1 Complementarity  
 
Bohr’s idea of complementarity has been treated extensively in the literature.  But it is 
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 In the original 1935 response to Schrödinger (which can be found in Kalckar 1996, p. 511), Bohr points 
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worthwhile to give a brief summary of the idea since, as we shall see below, it provides 
a good starting point regarding Bohr’s view on the wave function and wave function 
collapse. In general, complementarity means that the attribution of certain properties to 
quantum objects can take place only in experimental contexts which are mutually 
incompatible. Thus, for example, an experiment which can determine the position of an 
electron cannot be used to determine its momentum. Complementary properties, such as 
position and momentum, are both necessary for a full understanding of the object but, as 
manifested in Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations, the object cannot possibly be 
attributed precise values of both properties at the same time.
3
  
In a characteristic exposition from 1949, Bohr introduces the notion of 
complementarity by considering two variations of the famous double slit experiment. In 
the first, the diaphragms are kept fixed, and this allows for the appearance of an 
interference pattern on the photographic plate. In the second variation, the single-slit 
diaphragm is suspended by a spring, and so is allowed to move vertically (fig. 1). 
 
 
                   
 
Figure 1: Two variations of the double slit experiment. In the second 
variation, only the spring-suspended single slit diaphragm is depicted. 
Taken from Bohr (1949, p. 48). 
 
 
The movable diaphragm permits control of its momentum before and after the passage 
of the particle, and therefore the determination of which of the double slits the particle 
subsequently moves through. However, Bohr (1949, p. 46) observes that “…we are 
presented with a choice of either tracing the path of a particle or observing interference 
effects” [emphasis in original]. The point is that if the path is tracked, e.g. by controlling 
the momentum gain of the spring-suspended diaphragm due to the particle’s passage, 
the position of this diaphragm when the particle passes through becomes uncertain. The 
uncertainty is the result of an uncontrollable interaction (involving e.g. a momentum 
change of the diaphragm) when the momentum measurement is made, and it implies a 
washout of the interference pattern.
4
 Bohr concludes (1949, 46): 
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 The relation between complementarity and the uncertainty relations was spelled out already in Bohr’s 
Como lecture (1928, p. 60): “According to the quantum theory a general reciprocal relation exists 
between the maximum sharpness of definition of the space-time and energy-momentum vectors 
associated with the individuals. This circumstance may be regarded as a simple symbolical expression for 
the complementary nature of the space-time description and the claims of causality”. For the purposes of 
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We have here to do with a typical example of how the complementary 
phenomena appear under mutually exclusive experimental arrangements... 
and [we] are just faced with the impossibility, in the analysis of quantum 
effects, of drawing any sharp separation between an independent 
behaviour of atomic objects and their interaction with the measuring 
instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the 
phenomena occur. [My emphasis]  
 
As we shall see below, one way this impossibility is manifested is through Bohr’s idea 
that the wave function (e.g. of an electron in a double slit experiment) only refers to the 
object in a given experimental context. Thus, for instance, insofar as the electron can be 
described as a traveling wave in the double slit experiment, this description only makes 
sense in a setup in which we plan to investigate the interference pattern.  
Furthermore, Bohr associates complementarity with what he calls indivisibility 
which, as we shall see, is closely related to his notion of wave function collapse. Bohr 
writes (1956, p. 168): 
 
The essential indivisibility of proper quantum phenomena finds logical 
expression in the circumstance that any attempt at a well-defined 
subdivision would require a change in the experimental arrangement that 
precludes the appearance of the phenomenon itself. Under these 
conditions, it is not surprising that phenomena observed with different 
experimental arrangements appear to be contradictory when it is 
attempted to combine them in a single picture. Such phenomena may 
appropriately be termed complementary in the sense that they represent 
equally important aspects of the knowledge obtainable regarding the 
atomic objects and only together exhaust this knowledge. 
 
The indivisibility of quantum phenomena thus implies that the precise measurement 
process (i.e. what is physically going on when a quantum object interacts with an 
instrument) is unanalyzable in terms of a causal space-time description. This was a main 
point already in the Como lecture (Bohr 1928), in which the indivisibility is an 
expression of what Bohr called the quantum postulate. 
Indivisibility also means that object and apparatus are dynamically inseparable 
until a measurement has been made; see also Faye (2008). Here is what Bohr says in the 
Como lecture (1928, p. 54):  
 
Now the quantum postulate implies that any observation of atomic 
phenomena will involve an interaction with the agency of observation not 
to be neglected. Accordingly, an independent reality in the ordinary 
physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the 
agencies of observation. [My emphasis] 
 
In his interesting and influential reconstruction of Bohr, Howard (1994, 2004) interprets 
this point in terms of entanglement between the object and the apparatus. I believe this 
is consistent with what Bohr writes elsewhere, as long as it is taken to mean that parts 
                                                                                                                                               
 
quantum-mechanical description, we have to deal here with a two-body system consisting of the 
diaphragm as well as of the particle, ...” (Bohr 1949, p. 45). Hence it is the combined system of object and 
diaphragm (and not the diaphragm alone) which is ‘disturbed’ by the momentum measurement.  
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of the apparatus (e.g. the spring-suspended diaphragm from above) are entangled with 
the object. But a main point of the present paper is that Bohr could not have subscribed 
to the idea that the apparatus, as a whole, is entangled with the object. As will be 
discussed further below, the reason is that the apparatus must also encompass classically 
described parts. 
 
 
2.2 The wave function 
 
A key to the difference between Bohr’s interpretation and various versions of what has 
become known as the Copenhagen interpretation lies in the understanding of the wave 
function. Moreover, as I shall argue below, Bohr’s understanding of the wave function 
was not quite what even careful commentators have taken it to be.  
For a start, discussions of the Copenhagen interpretation in the literature are 
ambiguous between two different views of the wave function, both of which of course 
accept the Born interpretation.
5
 Sometimes the Copenhagen (and Bohr’s) interpretation 
is associated with the epistemic view of the quantum state, according to which the 
quantum state is but a representation of our knowledge of the physical system, and thus 
not a real existing entity in itself. On this view the ‘collapse’ of the wave function is not 
a physical process, and it just reflects an update of our information about the system; 
see e.g. Zeilinger (1999). By contrast, the Copenhagen interpretation has also been 
associated with an ontological view of the quantum state, in which the wave function 
somehow describes a real wave, and the collapse is a real physical process – presumably 
induced by the observer. This ontological view is usually attributed to von Neumann in 
his 1932 textbook exposition of quantum mechanics; see e.g. Henderson (2010).  
Bohr scholars have mostly associated his interpretation of quantum mechanics 
with a rejection of the ontological view of the quantum state. For instance, Murdoch 
(1987, p. 122) argues that Bohr preferred the epistemic interpretation; also as opposed 
to the statistical interpretation in which the wave function describes only ensembles of 
individual microphysical objects. Likewise, Faye (2008) asserts that Bohr held an 
instrumental view in which “…the state vector's representational function should not be 
taken literally but be considered a tool for the calculation of probabilities of 
observables”.  However, while it is true that Bohr mostly stressed epistemological and 
instrumental aspects of quantum mechanics (e.g. by speaking of the description of 
quantum systems, and of the theory as a tool for predictions), he also hinted that the 
wave function was not merely epistemic (or instrumental or statistical). The fact is that 
the wave function, for Bohr, is symbolic – a symbolic representation of a quantum 
system – and his view appears to have certain ontological implications regarding 
representation and explanation.
6
 To see this, let us first look at why Bohr did not accept 
a straightforward ontological reading of the wave function as a real wave.  
In the Como lecture Bohr gives three reasons for why the wave function cannot 
be visualized (and interpreted) as a real wave in space-time: i) The wave function is 
imaginary, that is, its mathematical expression contains the square root of -1; ii) it is 
formulated in configuration space which, in general, has more than the usual three 
spatial dimensions; and iii) “Schrödinger’s formulation of the interaction problem… 
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involves a neglect of the finite velocity of propagation of forces claimed by relativity 
theory” (i.e. the Schrödinger equation is non-relativistic), Bohr (1928, p. 77). Bohr 
stresses the second reason as the more important one for this non-visualizability, which 
excludes an ontological reading of the wave function as representing a classical wave in 
space-time. As Bohr puts it in 1932, “…the symbolic aspect of Schrodinger’s wave 
functions appears immediately from the use of a multidimensional co-ordinate space, 
essential for their representation in the case of atomic systems with several electrons” 
(Kalckar 1985, p. 401).  
Thus, although the quantum state represents the system or object, it cannot – in 
general – be given a pictorial interpretation (i.e. it is not visualizable as a real wave in 
spacetime). However, this also means that there can be special situations, like the free 
non-relativistic electron in the double slit experiment with fixed diaphragms (where the 
wave function is three-dimensional), in which we can visualize or picture the 
development of (at least the square of) the wave function as a representation of a 
quantum object moving through the experimental arrangement. In such cases the wave 
function can be identified with the wave field (or wave packet) associated with the 
motion of a single particle.
7
 This identification can be seen, for instance, in the response 
to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, where Bohr notes regarding the case of a particle 
passing through a slit in a diaphragm (1935, p. 75): “…the diffraction by the slit of the 
plane wave giving the symbolic representation of its [the particle’s] state [as a spherical 
wave] will imply an uncertainty in the momentum of the particle, after it has passed the 
diaphragm…” [my inserts]. A similar statement can be found in Bohr (1949, p. 43), 
where Bohr also includes the traveling wave fronts in a pictorial representation of the 
double slit experiment (1949, p. 45, figure 3). 
 Bohr’s account of the interference pattern in the double slit experiment, in terms 
of traveling wave fronts and diffraction of plane waves, strongly suggests that the wave 
function in this case has an explanatory role which goes beyond an instrumentalist 
reading of this function (insofar as it represents the electron as a wave field going 
through both slits). The reliance on wave aspects of the electron in the account of the 
interference pattern is also apparent when Bohr says (1949, p. 45): “With intense beams, 
this pattern is built up by the accumulation of a large number of individual processes, 
each giving rise to a small spot on the photographic plate, and the distribution of these 
spots follows a simple law derivable from the wave analysis” (my emphasis). This 
explanation (using the wave aspect of the particle’s motion) only accounts for the 
distribution of the spots and not for the fact that the spots appear in the first place (in 
accordance with the idea that the precise measurement process is unanalyzable). But it 
implies that Bohr’s conception of the wave function is not vulnerable to the critique, 
indicated e.g. by Pusey et al. (2012), that a purely epistemic or instrumental 
interpretation of the wave function appears insufficient to explain e.g. the wave-like 
interference pattern in the double slit experiment. In any case, even for a single electron 
wave function, a full ontological interpretation as a real wave in spacetime is excluded 
by it being complex (and non-relativistic).  
A further important element in Bohr’s conception of the symbolic (as opposed to 
ontologically real) wave function is that it is contextual. Here is what Bohr says (1958, 
p. 5), after having explained the necessity of a classical physical description of the 
measuring device: 
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In the treatment of atomic problems, actual calculations are most 
conveniently carried out with the help of a Schrödinger state function, 
from which the statistical laws governing observations obtainable under 
specified conditions can be deduced by definite mathematical operations. 
It must be recognized, however, that we are here dealing with a purely 
symbolic procedure, the unambiguous physical interpretation of which in 
the last resort requires a reference to a complete experimental 
arrangement.  
 
Thus, for Bohr, the wave function is a representation of a quantum system in a 
particular, classically described, experimental context. Three important points need to 
be made regarding this contextuality: 1) When a measurement is performed (that is, 
when an irreversible recording has been made; see below), then the context changes, 
and hence the wave function changes. This can formally be seen as a “collapse” of the 
wave function, with the square quotes indicating that we are not talking about a physical 
process in which a real wave collapses. 2) The distinction between an epistemic and 
ontic view of the wave function is sometimes taken to be that between a “representation 
of an agent’s knowledge of the system” and a “representation of the system” (see e.g. 
Friederich 2013). In this sense, Bohr’s view of the wave function is ontic, for – given an 
experimental context – the wave function is not agent-relative (i.e. the wave function 
does not depend on what a particular agent knows about the system but on the 
experimental arrangement and what in fact has happened to the system, e.g. whether or 
not the electron has been registered). 3) The experimental context is classically 
described (see section 3), which implies that this context is omitted from the quantum 
description, and thus not represented by means of a wave function. This furthermore 
implies that no wave function can be ascribed to the measurement apparatus as a whole 
(including recording devices such as pointers or photographic plates). For this reason, 
the above mentioned reconstruction of Bohr in terms of entanglement between object 
and apparatus (Howard 1994, 2004), cannot work if applied to the measuring apparatus 
as a whole; see also below and Zinkernagel (2015).
8
 
 
 
2.3 Wave function collapse 
 
Among Bohr scholars it is common to assert that Bohr never mentions the wave 
function collapse (see e.g. Howard 2004 and Faye 2008). It is true that in Bohr’s 
published writings, he does not discuss the status or existence of this standard 
component in the popular image of the Copenhagen interpretation. However, in his 
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unpublished works and letters one can find at least a few occasions where the collapse is 
mentioned. In a draft version of the Como lecture from October 12, 1927, Bohr accepts 
the idea of wave packet collapse (introduced in Heisenberg’s 1927 paper on the 
uncertainty relations), and he links it to the statistical character of quantum mechanics 
(Kalckar 1985, p. 94):  
 
Due to the gradual spreading of the wave fields associated with the 
individuals the statistical character of the description, however, is by no 
means limited to the inaccuracy expressed by Heisenberg’s relations. 
Indeed, we are forced to contemplate a proper reduction of the spatial 
extension of the fields after every new observation.  
 
At the outset of the Como lecture (both drafts and final version), Bohr had associated 
the statistical character of the quantum formalism with the lack of a rigorous definition 
of the object system, due to the unavoidable interaction with the measuring instruments 
(this interaction being implied by the quantum postulate and formally expressed through 
Heisenberg’s relations). But in the draft quoted here, Bohr now points out that an 
additional statistical element, due to a “proper reduction” or collapse of the wave fields, 
is associated with each observation or measurement. In spite of this, the reduction or 
collapse does not appear in the published version of the Como lecture.  What changed 
Bohr’s mind? One can only speculate, but it seems reasonable to assert that it has to do 
with the intervention of Bohr’s close friend Wolfgang Pauli. Indeed, Bohr urged Pauli 
for comments to a draft version of the Como lecture.
9
  
In the beginning of his response to Bohr’s query, Pauli first points out with 
respect to the origin of the statistical character of the quantum description (Kalckar 
1985, p. 32):  
 
…it has become clear to me that the statistical interpretation of the 
theoretical results always enters at the point when one divides a closed 
system into two parts, which one interprets as object under observation 
and measuring instrument, respectively, and then asks what one can say 
about one part without knowledge of the other.  
(Pauli to Bohr, October 17, 1927) 
 
A bit further down in Pauli’s response, he comments directly on Bohr’s mentioning of 
the “proper [or discontinuous]
10
 reduction of the spatial extension of the fields” 
(Kalckar 1985, p. 33):
 
 
 
This is of course just a point which was not quite satisfactory in the 
Heisenberg paper; there the ‘reduction of the wavepacket’ seemed a bit 
mysterious. Now it should of course be emphasized that such reductions 
first of all are not necessary when all the measuring instruments are 
included in the system.  [But] in order to be able to describe the results of 
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observation theoretically at all, one must ask what can be said about one 
part of the total system on its own. And then one sees as a matter of 
course the complete solution – that the omission of the instruments of 
observation in many cases (not always, of course) may formally be 
replaced by such discontinuous reductions.”
11
 
(Pauli to Bohr, October 17, 1927, emphasis in original)  
 
Pauli’s suggestion appears to correspond to the idea, in modern language, of taking a 
“partial trace” of a composite entangled state to obtain a reduced state for one of several 
interacting subsystems. In the case where one is interested only in finding out about the 
object, this reduced state will be a statistical mixture of collapsed object states. 
However, as often pointed out, the reduced state (or reduced density matrix) is not 
“ignorance interpretable” (the mixture is improper) and so it cannot be interpreted as if 
the object were actually in an unknown definite state. Taking a partial trace is therefore 
not equivalent to a collapse of the wave function; see e.g. Schlosshauer (2007, p. 333).
12
 
Hence, if Pauli is thinking along the lines of reduced states, his assertion that the 
collapse or reduction of the wave function is merely a formal replacement for the 
omission (or “tracing out”) of the instrument is problematic. In any case, if this reduced 
state reading of Pauli is correct, he would seem to treat both object and instrument as 
(entangled) quantum systems.
13
 
It would have been very interesting to have a written response from Bohr to 
Pauli regarding the collapse. But whereas Bohr may have received Pauli’s letter just 
before leaving for the famous 1927 Solvay conference (which took place from 24-29 
October), it is natural to think that the two men discussed the matter in person at that 
meeting.
14
 
Whatever Bohr precisely thought about Pauli’s remarks on the collapse, he most 
likely could not have accepted a full quantum description of both object and 
instrument.
15
 For, as already noted, Bohr would later insist on a classical description of 
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view when he notes that “…the concept of observation is in so far arbitrary as it depends upon which 
objects are included in the system to be observed”, and that “...for every particular case it is a question of 
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at least part of the measurement apparatus. Nevertheless, he may well have taken from 
Pauli that the collapse is merely a formal device which is somehow related to the split 
between the instrument and the object. This would go some way to explain that Bohr 
never speaks of the collapse in his published writings. Moreover, Bohr might well have 
worried that even mentioning the collapse could suggest that we are talking about a 
physical process – a real collapsing wave – which, in his view, we clearly are not. 
Although the collapse is not explicitly mentioned, it does seem to be implied in 
Bohr’s 1949 account of his discussions with Einstein at the Solvay meeting. Thus, Bohr 
comments on Einstein’s “…deep concern over the extent to which causal account in 
space and time was abandoned in quantum mechanics” (Bohr 1949, p. 41), and he goes 
on to discuss an example, used by Einstein on this occasion, of a particle passing 
through a slit and subsequently being registered on a photographic plate. Bohr notes 
(1949, p. 42): 
 
The apparent difficulty, in this description, which Einstein felt so acutely, 
is the fact that, if in the experiment the electron is recorded at one point A 
of the plate, then it is out of the question of ever observing an effect of 
this electron at another point (B), although the laws of ordinary wave 
propagation offer no room for a correlation between two such events. 
 
Thus, apparently, we have to do with a wave-to-particle transition, or a physical 
collapse in which no interference between different components of the wave function is 
possible after the collapse to a single component has taken place. Indeed, according to 
the notes of the discussions from the Solvay meeting (Kalckar 1985, p. 102), Einstein’s 
point was that “…the interpretation according to which |ψ|2 expresses the probability 
that this particle [pertaining to an individual process] is situated at a certain place 
presupposes a very particular [or “entirely peculiar”] mechanism of action at a distance 
[the collapse] which would prevent the wave continuously distributed in space from 
acting at two places of the screen” (Kalckar 1985, p. 102, my inserts, emphases in 
original).
16
 Furthermore, Einstein notes that this action-at-a-distance difficulty follows 
from describing the process solely in terms of a (real) Schrödinger wave, and he 
suggests that the problem can only be circumvented by assuming the particle to be 
localized also during its propagation. By contrast, on Bohr’s view, the difficulty is only 
apparent as we are not dealing with a real wave representing the electron, and as no 
causal space-time description of the registration process can be given (see also below). 
Returning to the Bohr-Pauli correspondence, the collapse is to my knowledge 
not further mentioned until 1955. In a discussion of the notion of a ‘detached observer’ 
and of whether observations somehow create the results, Pauli again refers to the 
reduction of wave packets (Favrholdt 1999, p. 564): 
 
In quantum mechanics …an observation hic et nunc [here and now] 
changes in general the “state” of the observed system in a way not 
contained in the mathematically formulated laws, which only apply to the 
automatical time dependence of the state of a closed system. I think here 
                                                                                                                                               
 
convenience at what point the concept of observation involving the quantum postulate with its inherent 
‘irrationality’ is brought in” (Bohr 1928, 54). 
16
 The inserted expression “entirely peculiar” is from the published version of the Solvey proceedings, see 
Bacciagaluppi and Valentini (2009, p. 487) and also (2009, section 7.1) for more discussion of Einstein’s 
remarks. As explained by these authors (2009, p. 476, note a), the Bohr Archive’s notes in Kalckar (1985) 
differ somewhat from what was finally published in the Solvay proceedings. 
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on the passage to a new phenomenon by observation which is technically 
taken into account by the socalled “reduction of the wave packets.” [My 
insert, emphasis in original] 
(Pauli to Bohr, 15 February, 1955) 
 
Pauli is here referring to the well-known distinction between the deterministic evolution 
in Schrödinger’s equation (the law) and the collapse which he suggests is brought about 
by the observer. In his response, Bohr writes on this point (Favrholdt 1999, p. 568): 
  
I take it for granted that, as regards the fundamental physical problems 
which fall within the scope of the present quantum mechanical formalism, 
we have the same view, but I am afraid that we sometimes use a different 
terminology.
17
 Thus, when speaking of the physical interpretation of the 
formalism, I consider such details of procedure like “reduction of the 
wave packets” as integral parts of a consistent scheme conforming with 
the indivisibility of the phenomena and the essential irreversibility 
involved in the very concept of observation [or recording].
18
 As stressed 
in the article, it is also in my view very essential that the formalism allows 
of well defined applications only to closed phenomena, and that in 
particular the statistical description just in this sense appears as a rational 
generalization of the strictly deterministic description of classical physics. 
(Bohr to Pauli, 2 March, 1955) 
 
Bohr here associates three aspects with the collapse: 1) Indivisibility of the phenomena; 
2) the essential irreversibility involved in a recording; and 3) that the quantum 
formalism is only applicable to closed phenomena (= those whose observation results in 
definite results, see next section) which are associated with a statistical description. As 
we saw in the discussion of complementarity above, the first point of indivisibility 
means that the phenomena are not further analyzable, due to the incontrollable 
interaction (or dynamic inseparability) between quantum system and apparatus. Thus, 
we cannot give a precise causal space-time account e.g. of the formation of a dot on the 
photographic plate in a double slit experiment.  
The collapse cannot therefore correspond to a physical process amendable to a 
causal space-time description (in conformity with the view that the wave function does 
not represent a physical wave). Calling the collapse a “detail of procedure” again 
suggests that Bohr took it to be a formal (as opposed to physical) notion in which a 
superposition is replaced by one of its components.  As noted in the above subsection, 
this replacement is due to the change of context associated with an irreversible 
recording and not because an observer looks at the system. We can thus say that, for 
Bohr, the collapse is not physical in the sense of a physical wave (or something else) 
collapsing at a point. But it is a description – in fact the best, or most complete, 
description – of something happening, namely the formation of a measurement record 
(e.g. a dot on a photographic plate). 
                                                 
 
17
 I thank Finn Aaserud for the remark (in private communication) that this is the strongest possible form 
in which Bohr can say that he deeply disagrees with Pauli on this issue!  
18
 In Bohr’s next letter to Pauli (from March 25, 1955), he explains that by ‘observation’ he is not 
referring to any active role of the observer in bringing about the measurement outcome: “Indeed, I really 
think that our divergency is more related to the use of the word observation itself, with which I simply 
understand a recording which is unambiguously communicable in common language without requiring 
any, further creative treatment” (Favrholdt 1999, p. 575).   
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A mathematical model of the collapse, which may roughly capture the spirit of 
Bohr’s idea in formal terms, can be found in Landau and Lifshitz (1981, pp. 21-24). 
Landau and Lifshitz (p. 22) speak about a change or collapse of the total system (object 
× apparatus) upon a measurement. As they point out, this total system is not taken to be 
a quantum system, but rather a combination of a quantum and a classical system. 
Formally, Landau and Lifshitz assign a ‘quasi-classical’ wave function to the apparatus, 
which allows for the fact that the apparatus is always – before, during and after 
measurement – in a definite state. Nevertheless, as already mentioned (see also below), 
Bohr argued that a part of the measurement apparatus may be included in the quantum 
system, in which case a measurement on this part corresponds to a collapse of an 
entangled state of two quantum systems.
19
 
 
 
3. The necessity of the classical  
 
I now return to Schrödinger’s question noted in the introduction. Why did Bohr insist on 
a classical description of the experimental arrangement and the results of observations? 
In order to answer this question, one should first be clear about what precisely Bohr 
understood by classical concepts and descriptions. Although there has been some debate 
on this issue, commentators usually take Bohr to refer straightforwardly to the concepts 
and descriptions used in classical physics (see e.g. Bokulich and Bokulich 2005). This 
standard idea is supported already in the Como lecture where Bohr notes that there is “a 
fundamental contrast between the quantum of action and the classical concepts” (1928, 
p. 57), and that “the limitation in the classical concepts [are] expressed through [the 
uncertainty] relation” (1928, p. 60). Classical concepts are therefore those in which 
Planck’s constant do not enter, e.g. the ordinary, commuting, position and momentum 
variables from classical physics. Correspondingly, a classical description is one in terms 
of classical concepts, and one in which there is no restriction to the simultaneous use of 
pairs of such concepts (as opposed to complementarity).
20
 
As illustrated by the first quote in the introduction, it is clear that Bohr took the 
use of classical concepts and descriptions to be a necessary condition for unambiguous 
communication. While many authors have focused on Bohr’s emphasis on the role of 
language, Howard (1994, p. 208 ff.) points out that Bohr’s precise argument regarding 
this role is more subtle than usually assumed. According to Howard, the best 
interpretation of Bohr on this point is that classical concepts must be used “…because 
they embody the instrument-object separability assumption” (1994, p. 209). This 
separability is necessary for the very idea of a measurement since it is what “…enable 
us to say that this definite object possesses this definite property” (1994, p. 209, 
                                                 
 
19
 In general, a measurement for Bohr can refer either to a fixation of the external (experimental) 
conditions – which implies a fixation of the initial state of the atomic system – or to the obtainment of a 
recording. Bohr held that we have a well-defined quantum phenomenon only when both kinds of 
measurements have been made (Bohr 1938, p. 101). The need for such a combination of measurements is 
strikingly illustrated in modern ‘which-path’ and ‘quantum eraser’ experiments. For instance, one can in a 
double-slit like experiment postpone the decision between getting interference effects or path information 
(by fixing the external conditions) until after the recording of the particle; see e.g. Herzog et al. (1995).  
20
 Against this standard account, Howard’s (1994, 2004) reconstruction of Bohr takes classical 
descriptions to be descriptions in which one (in a given experimental context) denies the entanglement 
between, and so assumes the separability of, the object studied and the measurement apparatus. Some of 
my reasons for disagreeing with Howard’s reconstruction have been given above, and others will become 
apparent below.  
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emphasis in original). I think Howard is right concerning the close relation for Bohr 
between an objective (and unambiguous) description and the separability or distinction 
between object and instrument. But, as already noted, I do not agree with Howard that 
Bohr took this separability assumption to be based on a factual entanglement between 
two quantum systems (object and instrument). This is related to two additional but often 
overlooked arguments given by Bohr for the necessity of classical descriptions. These 
could be called, respectively, closedness and reference system. The first argument also 
contains what I think must be Bohr’s answer to the standard measurement problem in 
quantum mechanics.  
Let me start with the closedness argument and the measurement problem. In his 
published writings Bohr never discusses this problem, originally addressed by von 
Neumann in 1932, in the usual terms of expected superpositions of the states of the 
measurement apparatus.
21
 Nevertheless, Bohr was familiar with von Neumann’s account 
(on which he briefly comments in Bohr 1938, p. 120), and I think it is most likely that 
Bohr was also aware that his own view constituted a solution, or rather dissolution, of 
the measurement problem. For example, Bohr (1954, p. 73) says:  
 
…every atomic phenomenon is closed in the sense that its observation is 
based on registrations obtained by means of suitable amplifications 
devices with irreversible functioning such as, for example, permanent 
marks on a photographic plate … [T]he quantum-mechanical formalism 
permits well-defined applications referring only to such closed 
phenomena.  
 
Thus, the quantum mechanical formalism can only be applied in a well-defined manner 
to phenomena whose observation results in definite and irreversible outcomes (call this 
closedness).
22
 But the point of the measurement problem is precisely that a pure 
quantum mechanical treatment of both the apparatus and the studied object cannot give 
rise to such definite outcomes. So Bohr’s point can be seen as a solution to (or 
dissolution of) the measurement problem: If the apparatus registering the outcome is 
classical, so that it has a well-defined state at any time, then there is no problem with 
macroscopic superpositions at the end of measurements. 
A more precise version of this argument of closedness (involving the 
measurement problem) seems to be hinted at in an article from 1958. Bohr is first, once 
again, pointing out that (1958, p.3):  
 
…the description of the experimental arrangement and the recording of 
observations must be given in plain language, suitably refined by the 
usual [classical] physical terminology. This is a simple logical demand, 
since by the word “experiment” we can only mean a procedure regarding 
which we are able to communicate to others what we have done and what 
we have learnt. [My insert] 
 
Here and elsewhere Bohr seems to presuppose that experiments have unambiguous 
(definite) and communicable results and, indeed, this must be so for the experimental 
method to make sense. Add to this the premise that if instruments were quantum, then 
there would not be any definite results. This premise would be familiar to Bohr not only 
from Von Neumann’s work (and his projection or collapse postulate) but also from what 
                                                 
 
21
 For a simple introduction to the measurement problem, see e.g. Zinkernagel (2011, section 2.1). 
22
 As we saw in section 2.3, irreversibility and definiteness form part of Bohr’s view on the collapse. 
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Pauli noted in his 1927 letter quoted above; namely that if we do not make an 
instrument/object split, we cannot “describe the results of observation theoretically at 
all”.
23
 With these premises in place, we can understand Bohr’s insistence on “…the 
introduction of a fundamental distinction between the measuring apparatus and the 
objects under investigation” which is “a direct consequence of the necessity of 
accounting for the functions of the measuring instruments in purely classical terms, 
excluding in principle any regard to the quantum of action” (Bohr 1958, p. 3, emphasis 
in original). Contrary to the standard measurement problem (which starts from the 
theory), Bohr can thus be seen to take the unambiguous and definite results of 
measurements as the interpretational starting point. Seeing the necessity of the classical 
in light of this argument of closedness is supported also by the end of Bohr (1958, p. 6), 
in which he mentions “…the emphasis on permanent recordings under well-defined 
experimental conditions as the basis for a consistent interpretation of the quantum 
formalism…”. 
The argument of closedness and the associated dissolution of the measurement 
problem still leave open precisely how and where the distinction between the classical 
and the quantum should be made. To clarify this it is helpful to consider again the 
double slit experiment. In a section entitled “the observation problem in quantum 
theory”, which includes a discussion of this experiment, Bohr writes (1938, p. 104):  
 
In the system to which the quantum mechanical formalism is applied, it is 
of course possible to include any intermediate auxiliary agency employed 
in the measuring process. [My emphasis] 
 
An example of such an intermediate auxiliary agency is the spring-suspended 
diaphragm with one slit, which may be used for a momentum control (and hence 
particle path determination), in the double slit experiment (see also Bohr 1949, p. 50). 
Bohr continues the former quote (1938, p. 104):  
 
Since, however, all those properties of such agencies which, according to 
the aim of the measurement, have to be compared with corresponding 
properties of the object, must be described on classical lines, their 
quantum mechanical treatment will for this purpose be essentially 
equivalent with a classical description. The question of eventually 
including such agencies within the system under investigation is thus 
purely a matter of practical convenience… 
 
In the double-slit case, what I think Bohr here has in mind is that we can determine the 
momentum of the suspended diaphragm just as in classical physics; e.g. by employing 
momentum conservation in a collision process between the diaphragm and some test 
body (see Bohr 1935, p. 698). Such a determination can be made with any desired 
precision, although there will be a corresponding uncertainty in the position of the 
diaphragm and of the particle when the particle passes. Therefore, as regards the 
                                                 
 
23
 Apart from Pauli’s letter, Bohr’s knowledge of this premise can also be inferred from Heisenberg’s 
remark from the 1927 Solvay meeting: “In quantum mechanics, as professor Bohr has displayed, 
observation plays quite a peculiar role. One may treat the whole world as one mechanical system, but then 
only a mathematical problem remains while the access to observation is closed off. To get an observation, 
one must therefore cut out a partial system somewhere from the world, and one must make “statements” 
or “observations” just about this particular system” (Kalckar 1985, p. 141). 
 
15 
 
momentum determination, there is no difference (but rather an “essential equivalence”) 
between a classical and a quantum description of the diaphragm. Moreover, while the 
uncertainty in the position of the diaphragm is important for the quantum phenomena 
(as no interference pattern results when the path is determined), it is of course a small 
uncertainty in comparison to the dimensions of the diaphragm. This is in accordance 
with the pragmatic point that quantum effects can usually be ignored for macroscopic 
bodies. These observations suggest that the distinction between classical and quantum 
coincides with that between measuring instruments and objects (where the latter may 
include parts of the apparatus, such as the spring-suspended diaphragm).
24
 
Notwithstanding the necessary distinction between the classical and the 
quantum, Bohr stresses that the classical description of objects is strictly speaking valid 
only as an approximation in the limit where one can ignore the quantum of action. In 
some sense then, the description of any object depends on the quantum of action. 
However, this does not imply that Bohr’s requirement of a classical description of the 
measuring device is merely a pragmatic or epistemological arrangement, and that the 
device is really a quantum mechanical system.
25
 For the application of quantum 
mechanics to a system depends on disregarding – not just in practice but also in 
principle – the quantum of action for some other system. There are at least two reasons 
for this, and they have to do, respectively, with the already mentioned measurement 
problem and with the reference system argument for the necessity of classical concepts 
and descriptions, to which we now turn.  
Bohr insisted that when an object, e.g. a part of a measuring apparatus, is treated 
quantum mechanically, there must always then be a different system which is treated 
classically. As we saw in section 2.2, this is formally reflected in the contextuality of the 
wave function, that is, that such a wave function can be ascribed to a system only in a 
given, classically described, context. More specifically regarding reference systems, 
Bohr concludes the former quote on the possibility of including part of the apparatus in 
the quantum description as follows (1938, p. 104): 
 
...in each case some ultimate measuring instruments, like the scales and 
clocks which determine the frame of space-time coordination – on which, 
in the last resort, even the definitions of momentum and energy quantities 
                                                 
 
24
 Howard (1994) dismisses this common reading, which he calls the “coincidence interpretation”, of 
Bohr. In its place, Howard (1994, p. 217 ff.) interprets the mentioned “essential equivalence” between 
classical and quantum descriptions in terms of the distinction between mixed and pure states in quantum 
mechanics (which Howard takes to correspond to the classical-quantum distinction). However, apart from 
the dismissal of the coincidence interpretation being in tension e.g. with Bohr’s remarks in his response to 
EPR (see in particular 1935, p. 701), Howard’s reconstruction is difficult to square with Bohr’s demand 
that some parts of the measurement context must be described entirely on classical lines (note that a 
mixed quantum state is still a quantum state). Furthermore, as mentioned also by Schlosshauer and 
Camilleri (2008, p. 19), on Howard’s account Bohr ultimately does not solve the measurement problem. 
25
 Thus, in my view, Bohr did not subscribe to the idea that a quantum description of the measurement 
apparatus is avoided merely ‘for all practical purposes’ due to suppression of quantum effects for 
macroscopic bodies. Ideas such as this, nowadays pursued within the framework of decoherence, have 
been attributed to Bohr e.g. by Rosenfeld and Murdoch (see Murdoch 1987, p. 117). Nevertheless, as also 
pointed out in a very recent paper by Camilleri and Schlosshauer (2015), Bohr often referred to this 
pragmatic argument about the heaviness of the apparatus suppressing quantum effects. Camilleri and 
Schlosshauer take this as an indication for the view that Bohr’s insistence on a classical description of the 
apparatus is merely epistemological (related to a “…functional account of the experiment as a means of 
acquiring empirical knowledge”, (2015, p. 79)), while the apparatus ontologically is a quantum system. 
However, as noted above, this view is incompatible with what I believe was Bohr’s response to the 
measurement problem which, on the assumption that the apparatus is ontologically quantum, remains 
unresolved (see also Zinkernagel 2015 and discussion below). 
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rest – must always be described entirely on classical lines, and 
consequently kept outside the system subject to quantum mechanical 
treatment. [My emphasis]  
 
Bohr is here saying that the definitions of momentum and energy quantities (and, we 
may assume, spatial and temporal quantities) depend on a classically described 
reference frame. A way to understand Bohr’s point is that we need such a reference 
frame to make sense of, say, the position or momentum of an electron (in order to 
establish with respect to what the electron has a position or momentum). This reading is 
supported by Bohr’s response to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (Bohr 1935, p. 699), in 
which he says (about measurements on one of two previously interacting particles): 
 
…to measure the position of one of the particles can mean nothing else 
than to establish a correlation between its behavior and some instrument 
rigidly fixed to the support which defines the space frame of reference. 
 
As Dickson points out in connection with this quote, Bohr is not here endorsing 
operationalism (which would imply that position is defined in terms of a procedure for 
its measurement) but is rather claiming that “...a well-defined frame of reference is 
crucially a part of the notion of position.” (Dickson 2002, p. 269). Given that there is no 
absolute reference frame, or at least none which is empirically accessible, Bohr’s point 
in the quote can therefore be taken to be simply that any position (or momentum) 
adscription to an object must be specified with respect to a reference frame. 
The reference frame argument for classicality follows when it is noted that, by 
definition, a reference frame has a well-defined position and state of motion 
(momentum). Thus the reference frame is not subject to any Heisenberg uncertainty, and 
it is in this sense (and in this context) entirely classical.  This does not exclude that any 
given reference system could itself be treated quantum mechanically, but we would then 
need another – classically described – reference system e.g. to ascribe position (or 
uncertainty in position) to the former.
26
 
Both Bohr’s dissolution of the measurement problem and the reference frame 
argument suggest the view that any system may in principle be seen as and treated 
quantum mechanically, but not all systems can be seen as and treated in this way 
simultaneously.
27
 Bohr rejected in this sense what may be called ‘quantum 
fundamentalism’; the idea that all systems are essentially of a quantum nature and are 
ultimately describable as such (see also Rugh and Zinkernagel 2005, and Zinkernagel 
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 See also Dickson (2004) who argues that this requirement of a classical reference frame is crucial in 
Bohr’s reply to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen regarding the incompleteness of quantum mechanics. 
27
 From this follows, for instance, that a detailed investigation could in principle reveal a bit of jiggling of 
the center of mass of any macroscopic system, in accordance with the uncertainty relation for position and 
momentum (see also Bohr 1928, p. 67). But it is an open question whether the claim can be sustained for 
all physical properties, that is, whether a quantum treatment can be given for all degrees of freedom of a 
physical system (see Rugh and Zinkernagel 2016). The application of quantum theory needs clearly 
specified conditions, including well-defined state vectors, Hilbert spaces, classical contexts, etc. This 
point in particular questions whether properties such as the vitality of a cat can be given a quantum 
treatment (that is, whether often used expressions such as "|dead cat>" at all correspond to some pure state 
in a Hilbert space with well-defined properties), see also Dickson (2007, p. 298). In any case, Bohr seems 
to exclude the possibility of a quantum treatment of living systems when he comments (1957, p. 100): 
"...an account, exhaustive in the sense of quantum physics, of all the continually exchanged atoms in the 
organism not only is infeasible but would obviously require observational conditions incompatible with 
the display of life”.   
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2015). Instead, Bohr’s view seems to have been a form of ontological contextualism: 
whether an object is quantum or classical depends on the context. 
 
 
 
4. Relationship between the classical and the quantum 
 
Quantum mechanics is for Bohr a rational generalization of classical mechanics. This 
idea is sometimes understood as a consequence of the fact that formal expressions of 
classical mechanics can be derived from quantum mechanics, in the limit where all 
actions are large compared to Planck’s constant. While this common idea was part of 
Bohr’s thinking, the classical-quantum relation was by no means a way to eliminate (or 
reduce away) classical mechanics in some limit. Rather, a mutual dependence between 
the two theories obtains (Bohr 1938, p. 96): 
 
Indeed, as adequate as the quantum postulates are in the 
phenomenological description of the atomic reactions, as indispensable 
are the basic concepts of [classical] mechanics and electrodynamics for 
the specification of atomic structures and for the definition of 
fundamental properties of the agencies with which they react. Far from 
being a temporary compromise in this dilemma, the recourse to essentially 
statistical considerations is our only conceivable means of arriving at a 
generalization of the customary way of description sufficiently wide to 
account for the features of individuality expressed by the quantum 
postulates and reducing to classical theory in the limiting case where all 
actions involved in the analysis of the phenomena are large compared 
with a single quantum. In the search for the formulation of such a 
generalization, our only guide has just been the so called correspondence 
argument, which gives expression for the exigency of upholding the use 
of classical concepts to the largest possible extent compatible with the 
quantum postulates. [My insert]  
 
Besides the mutual dependence between classical and quantum theory, Bohr here refers 
to the correspondence argument or principle, and the idea of retaining the classical 
concepts as far as possible.
28
 Given these connection points between the classical and 
the quantum, Bohr would most likely have agreed with the succinct expression of 
Landau and Lifshitz (1981, p. 3): 
 
Quantum mechanics occupies a very unusual place among physical 
theories: it contains classical mechanics as a limiting case, yet at the same 
time it requires this limiting case for its own formulation. 
 
Bohr’s insistence of the classical description of the apparatus is one way to bring out 
this requirement. We have already discussed Bohr’s view on this issue, which has of 
course been noted by many authors, e.g. Tanona (2004, p. 690): “[T]he application of 
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 The correspondence argument may be seen as an instance of the correspondence principle, at least in 
the generalized version also discussed by Heisenberg (see Falkenburg 2007, p. 190). See also Bokulich 
and Bokulich (2005, p. 349) who in this connection cite Bohr’s idea that a rational generalization of 
classical physics “…would permit the harmonious incorporation of the quantum of action” (Bohr 1958, 
p.2). 
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the [quantum] theory to any particular experimental arrangement depends on conceptual 
apparatus external to the theory—i.e., it depends on classical physics.” 
However, quantum theory is surely relevant also for the description of 
phenomena not directly related to experimental arrangements. To see the generality of 
Bohr’s view of the classical-quantum relationship, it is therefore helpful to consider one 
of the few examples of a quantum phenomenon Bohr mentioned, in which no direct 
reference to a measuring apparatus is made. The example in question is that the stability 
of atoms, and therefore of matter, depends on the quantum of action or the ‘quantal 
laws’. This dependence is mentioned on several occasions in Bohr’s writings, e.g.: 
 
…it is indeed only the existence of the quantum of action which prevents 
the fusion of the electrons and the nucleus into a neutral massive 
corpuscle of practically infinitesimal extension. (Bohr 1937, p. 17-18) 
 
…we meet in experimental evidence concerning atomic particles with 
regularities of a novel type, incompatible with deterministic analysis. 
These quantal laws determine the peculiar stability and reactions of 
atomic systems, and are thus ultimately responsible for the properties of 
matter on which our means of observation depend. (Bohr 1958, p. 2) 
 
Regarding the stability of the atom, Bohr did not, to my knowledge, discuss precisely 
how classical considerations enter the picture,
29
 and I am also unaware of previous 
discussions of this issue in Bohr scholarship. But I think the mutual dependence 
between quantum and classical mechanics in this case may perhaps be understood as 
follows. Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation can, at least heuristically, explain why the 
electron does not spiral in to, and remain at, the center of the atomic nucleus. If an 
electron could remain at rest at the center of the atom, then both its momentum and its 
position would be well determined, in clear violation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
relation. But this explanation makes sense only in a context where the nucleus is 
assumed to be at a specific location (at which the electron then cannot remain at rest). In 
this argument, the nucleus therefore defines a frame of reference which, by definition, is 
not subject to uncertainty and can thus be seen as classical.
30
  
This does not mean that one must treat the nucleus classically in order to explain 
the stability of e.g. the hydrogen atom. The stability may also be accounted for by 
treating the electron and nucleus (proton) as a quantum two-body system. One can then 
solve the Schrödinger equation for the coupled quantum system, and find the mean 
value of the separation to be larger than zero. However, such an approach will again 
imply reference to some external classical context in order to specify the meaning of the 
mean or expectation value in terms of expected (definite) outcomes of position 
measurements.
31
 This is consistent with Bohr’s point, cited in section 3, that we always 
need a (classical described) reference frame which is “…kept outside the system subject 
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 Although he did indicate that the role of Planck’s constant in the stability and functioning of the 
measurement apparatus, did not change his general outlook on the quantum mechanical description (Bohr 
1949, p. 51). 
30
 Though Heisenberg uncertainty is often invoked to explain the stability of the hydrogen atom, it is 
strictly speaking insufficient. Moreover, for many-electron atoms the Pauli exclusion principle also comes 
into play. It remains true, however, that a basic feature leading to atomic stability is that a sharp 
localization of an electron (close to or at the nucleus) will increase the kinetic energy (and momentum) 
without bound; see Lieb (1976) for a discussion of these issues.  
31
 I thank Carlo Rovelli (private communication) for bringing my attention to these points on the two-
body approach to atomic stability. 
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to quantum mechanical treatment”.
32
  
While a nucleus may therefore be treated classically, a nucleus, a complete atom 
or a molecule may in many other contexts be considered and described quantum 
mechanically. But it requires in all cases, according to Bohr, that parts of the 
(experimental) context is considered and described in classical terms. That even objects 
like nuclei can be considered to be either quantum or classical, depending on the 
context, illustrates once more that the distinction between the quantum and the classical 
is flexible. 
 
 
5. Outlook 
 
After almost 90 years of discussion, there is still no consensus regarding which among 
the various alternatives is the better interpretation of quantum mechanics. Indeed, it 
seems to be widely recognized that any interpretation of the theory will involve some 
mystery, weirdness or, at least, problematic aspects.  
Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics involves the necessity of describing 
in classical terms some parts of any system exhibiting quantum effects, though which 
parts may vary from one context to another. I have argued above that this contextual 
divide between the classical and the quantum forms an essential part of Bohr’s view on 
the wave function, the collapse, and the measurement problem. While I believe Bohr’s 
position to be both coherent and convincing, it does not mean that there is no mystery 
left. As we have seen, a central ingredient in Bohr’s account of the collapse is the 
indivisibility or un-analyzability of the measurement process (by which, somehow, the 
object interacts with the instruments to produce a permanent mark in the latter). This is 
where mystery enters Bohr’s account, although it is a mystery with a name and a 
physical origin (see below). I think this is a perfectly respectable aspect of Bohr’s ideas, 
not least given that quantum phenomena – such as the double slit interference pattern – 
indeed have a mysterious air. But even if one disagrees, it should be recalled that other 
interpretations substitute the mystery for other types of weirdness at this point (e.g. a 
splitting of worlds for Everettians, or the effect of a non-local quantum potential and/or 
in-principle unmeasureable definite particle positions for Bohmians).  
Bohr was no instrumentalist and no mystic. He emphasized that there is a 
physical reason for the indivisibility; namely the quantum of action or Planck’s constant 
(the name of the mystery!). During the measurement process, the quantum of action 
induces an incontrollable interaction between the measurement apparatus and the object. 
This leads to complementarity which implies that we can either use space-time 
descriptions or a causal description but not both. And this again means that we cannot 
pinpoint a causal mechanism in spacetime which ultimately explains why a particular 
outcome occurs. Of course, nothing prevents us from keep investigating and reveal new 
features of the measurement process.
33
 But, if Bohr’s view on quantum mechanics is 
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 A similar point is made by Dickson (2004, p. 203) in a discussion of the use of relational coordinates 
(using just the distance between the electron and the proton) in the determination of the energy levels of 
hydrogen. Dickson observes that the use of relational coordinates depends on first separating out and then 
ignoring the center-of-mass coordinates for the combined system. But such center-of-mass coordinates 
are strictly speaking only defined in relation to some (classical described) reference frame (see also Rugh 
and Zinkernagel 2005, p. 59). 
33
 A case in point is the important phenomenon of decoherence which helps to explain why no quantum 
effects is seen on the ordinary macroscopic scale. However, as is well known, decoherence does not by 
itself constitute an adequate response either to the measurement problem or to the more general question 
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right, then a full microphysical space-time picture of this process will always remain 
elusive.  
Let me conclude with a few remarks on the continued relevance of Bohr’s 
interpretation, not only as a serious candidate for understanding quantum mechanics, 
but also with respect to quantum ideas in fundamental physics and cosmology. 
Regarding the former, some approaches to quantum gravity (e.g. Loop Quantum 
Gravity), assumes the Bohrian view that not everything can be treated quantum 
mechanically simultaneously. In particular, it may only be possible to address the 
quantum structure of spacetime (in a very small region) when a classical structure of 
spacetime (in a large region containing the small one) is presupposed.
34
 Regarding 
modern cosmology, a key issue is the supposed transition between quantum fluctuations 
and classical density perturbations during an assumed inflationary phase in the very 
early universe. This transition is believed to lie at the origin of structure formation in the 
universe. However, the idea is faced with what one may call the ‘cosmic measurement 
problem’; the problem of how to get classical structures from quantum constituents in a 
cosmological context. Also in this case, it may be argued – in consistency with Bohr’s 
point of view – that any account of the developments in the very early universe will 
depend on assuming part of the total system to be classical. In particular, such 
classicality may be needed in order to secure a physically meaningful concept of time, 
which is a precondition for addressing issues about the ‘early’ universe.  Thus, as argued 
in Rugh and Zinkernagel (2011, 2013), a well-defined cosmic time concept is closely 
related to a classically described motion of matter in the universe.  
Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics has sometimes been accused of 
putting an end to explanation, or to operate with an a priori classical domain which 
makes it unsuitable for cosmology and theories at the frontiers of fundamental physics. I 
hope the brief remarks above are sufficient to indicate that such assessments are 
mistaken.  
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